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On Amenities, Natural Advantage and Agglomeration
*
 
A prominent feature of economic geography in America is the positive correlation amongst 
local incomes, housing costs and city population. This paper embeds a “black box” 
agglomeration economy within a more neoclassical general equilibrium model of local wages, 
rents and population to assess the ability of various conceptual models to predict this cross-
sectional variation. I use exogenous changes in housing supply to induce changes in 
population and examine whether the changes in rents and wages move in the same direction 
under neo-classical assumptions, agglomeration economies in production, congestion in 
production, or urbanization economies in consumption. On their own, none of these urban 
scale effects generate the observed pattern. All urban scale effects generate a negative 
correlation between rents and population. Combining natural advantage with the urban scale 
effects improves the models’ output. It generally predicts positive correlations amongst the 
three variables, although some of these effects are ambiguous in the production 
agglomeration model. If natural advantage and housing supply constraints vary more-or-less 
independently, the results suggest a better fit of the data is provided by either the congestion 
in production or the agglomeration in consumption models. The micro-economics of such 
consumption-oriented agglomeration economies have received less attention than 
production-oriented agglomeration economies. The results of this model thus suggest that 
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exist despite their involvement, not because of it.  I. Introduction. 
A prominent feature of the American metropolitan system is the strong correlation 
amongst metropolitan average incomes, cost of living and population.  Figures 1 through 
3 show the relationships amongst these variables for 295 American cities in the year 2006 
using data from the American Community Survey.  These figures show a very tight 
relationship between incomes and rents, and somewhat noisier (but clearly positive) 
relationships between population and these two quantities.  In this paper I compare the 
ability of various assumptions about the nature of urbanization economies to generate this 
pattern within a general equilibrium setting.  
  The past decade or so has witnessed a blossoming of research into the effects of 
local increasing returns on the distribution of economic activity across space.  The chief 
goal of this literature has been to generate clustering of economic activity in cities or the 
clustering large cities in broader regions.  While a variety of microfoundations for these 
agglomeration economies have been proposed, most affect the productivity of firms.  
Theoretically, however, there is no reason why urbanization economies could only make 
firms more productive (or workers more productive on the job).  Amenities that affect 
consumers’ utility might also be produced endogenously with city size.    A third 
possible explanation for urban agglomerations could be natural advantage: large cities 
grow up where and when they do because of natural resources or specific aspects of the 
landscape, such as deep water harbors.  On the other hand, larger cities might actually be 
less enjoyable and profitable than smaller ones, all else equal.  These congestion 
economies could arise from overcrowded infrastructure, higher crime, or pollution, for 
example.  While congestion externalities could not explain the existence of cities, they 
  1could be operating at the margin if agglomeration economies have been exhausted at the 
scales at which we observe most cities.   
  Sorting out which explanations are important and which are merely theoretically 
consistent is an important task for urban and regional economists and economic 
geographers.  Knowing which of the theoretical models is the prime force that sustains 
cities not only offers a deeper understanding of the fundamental problems that cities form 
to address, but also informs the debate on regional policy, and what may be gained or lost 
as governments intervene in the distribution of economic activity within and across their 
borders.   
  To assess which of these broad categories of models best fits the patterns of city 
populations and prices mentioned in the opening paragraph, I embed a “black-box” 
agglomeration economy within a more neoclassical general equilibrium model similar to 
Roback (1982).  Such a model is attractive because it naturally brings rents and wages 
into the same equilibrium, while it is generally the case that any location will be 
populated.  Extensions from Krupka and Donaldson (2008) bring population explicitly 
into the model and thus the relationships between rents, wages and population as well as 
productive exogenous amenities can be examined in a relatively straightforward way.  
The model is also flexible enough to allow for various broad types of urbanization 
economies, or congestion as described above.    The assumptions of the model are quite 
general.  Residents prefer lower rents and higher wages while firms prefer areas with 
lower wages and rents.  Amenities can enter firms’ or residents’ objective function in the 
standard way.  While I do not model micro-foundations for agglomeration economies, 
they can be incorporated into the model by assuming firms (or residents) gain profit (or 
  2utility) from locating in areas with higher population.   Thus, the model provides a bird’s 
eye view of metropolitan labor and housing markets in the presence of different kinds of 
amenities and increasing returns.   
  The results show that natural advantage alone does a reasonably good job 
generating the desired pattern: as the prime generator of city size it creates an ambiguous 
but probably positive relationship between wages and rents, and between wages and 
population.  The relationship between rents and population is positive if one is willing to 
make slightly stronger assumptions.  Agglomeration alone generates a positive 
relationship between wages and population, but negative relationships between rents and 
the other two variables.  Under the stronger assumptions made above, a combination of 
agglomeration and natural advantage generates a positive relationship between rents and 
population, but ambiguous relationships between wages and these two variables. 
  Interestingly, better results are available if one assumes either that cities suffer 
from congestion (negative agglomeration economies) or that the agglomeration economy 
does not increase productivity, but increases utility.  These models, in combination with 
natural advantage, generate the strongest relationship between wages and rents, and 
predict a positive relationship between population and local labor and housing costs 
under the stronger assumptions.  That congestion or consumer-related agglomeration 
perform better than production-oriented agglomeration is a novel result, and potentially 
important, as these possibilities have received much less theoretical attention and very 
little empirical attention.  These results thus suggest that some additional investigation 
into these other types of local scale economies might be theoretically and empirically 
fruitful. 
  3  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II briefly outlines the 
relevant literatures.  Section III lays out the basic model without any agglomeration or 
congestion forces.  Section IV looks at the effects on the model of different kinds of 
returns to scale assumptions at the metropolitan level.  I start with agglomeration 
economies in production, and then move on to congestion in production and 
agglomeration economies in consumption.  Section V collects the results and compares 
them to the broad cross section patterns highlighted in figures 1 – 3.  Section VI 
concludes.   
 
II. Background literature. 
Determining the reasons for the dense concentration of economic activity is a primary 
empirical and theoretical goal of the regional economic and economic geography fields.  
The most obvious place to start such an examination is with the idea that these 
concentrations form because of desirable local characteristics which increase the 
productivity of firms.  Such characteristic endow certain locations with a “natural 
advantage” over other locations.  As Rosenthall and Strange (2001) comment, the idea 
that industrial agglomerations and therefore urban agglomerations might form in response 
to such natural features in the landscape has long been recognized.  Ellison and Glaeser 
(1997) comment that “while natural advantage reasons for geographic concentration may 
not be exciting intellectually, they are clearly important when accounting for some of the 
agglomeration we observe.”   
Natural advantage’s effect on industry-level concentration has found significant 
empirical support.  Ellison and Glaeser (1999) and Kim (1999) find that natural 
  4advantage matters, at least at the state level.  However, since in these papers local 
population, demographics and capital stocks are considered part of an area’s resource 
endowment, the case could be made that some of these effects are actually picking up 
agglomeration effects, or reverse causality.  Rosenthal and Strange (2001) use natural 
resource use intensity of industries to predict industrial concentration and find that natural 
resource use is positively associated with industrial concentration at the state level, but 
not at the county or smaller level. 
   As the quotation from Ellison and Glaeser (1997) attests, many economists felt 
unsatisfied with natural advantage as a generator of urban concentrations since in many 
cases the locations of cities – and their relative fortunes – seem much less deterministic.  
In any case, from a theoretician’s point of view, such an explanation is essentially 
equivalent to assuming the resulting agglomeration from the beginning.  Krugman (1991) 
presented a model hinging on imperfect competition, transportation costs and a 
preference for variety which generated core-periphery patterns endogenously.  This 
model has been considerably elaborated in the New Economic Geography (NEG) 
literature, which was reviewed recently by Ottaviano and Thisse (2004).  While the 
specifics of the models vary with assumptions,
1 in general, firms have an incentive to 
locate in more populated areas because of the greater access to the consumers there, 
while workers wish to locate in the more populated areas because of the greater variety of 
low-cost products available there.  While these models obviously leave a lot out, the 
generation of endogenous concentrations of economic activity is a major step forward.  
                                                 
1 Pflüger and Südekum (2008) show that some of the predictions depend on functional form, and analyze 
the model in a more general setting.  There have been many other exciting NEG papers since the 2004 
review, but the general focus of the NEG literature has not changed drastically. 
 
  5While natural advantage stories generally rely on industry-specific effects, NEG-style 
agglomeration economies are economy wide.     
While the NEG examines one set of possible agglomeration economies, a variety 
of other microfoundations for these metropolitan increasing returns have been proposed.  
Duranton and Puga (2004) categorize these non-NEG microfoundations as either sharing, 
matching or learning economies.  Firms might cluster together to share indivisible inputs 
such as harbors, or they might share the cost advantages from a greater specialization of 
input providers, or they might share risk.  On the other hand, firms might find clustering 
together increases profits because it improves the expected quality of their matches with 
workers, or increases the chances of making a match.  Finally, a variety of learning 
externalities have been hypothesized in which either the generation or transfer of ideas is 
easier – either for firms or individuals – in more populated areas.   
In this paper, I will not take a stand as to the sources of any possible increasing 
returns to urban scale.  I consider all of the above agglomeration sources to be affecting 
the productivity and thus profits of individual firms.  This allows the paper to take a 
broader view on the issue, at the cost of not being able to address the important issues of 
the source of these agglomeration economies.  As the goal is to compare much broader 
categories of urban scale effects than those delineated by Duranton and Puga (2004), this 
seems like the appropriate choice. 
While most of the sources of agglomeration effects discussed in Duranton and 
Puga (2004) are discussed in terms of advantages to firms, many are equally valid from 
the perspective of workers.   Sharing indivisible inputs relates directly to the ability of 
large populations to sustain expensive cultural and entertainment institutions such as 
  6museums and professional sports teams.  The importance of such local amenities has 
been stressed recently by Clark (2003).   Consumers in larger urban areas are also sharing 
the gains to greater variety of goods and services (Florida 2002).   They share the gains to 
a larger variety of public service levels alla Tiebout, and even in terms of the kinds of 
friends and lifestyle they can have (Fischer, 1975, discusses this in terms of a greater 
variety of subcultures in larger cities).  Residents of large areas also share risk in terms of 
the availability and quality of leisure activities.
2  Large urban agglomerations can also 
increase the expected probability and quality of matching in terms of the marriage 
market, which Costa and Kahn (2000) discuss.  The larger variety of public service 
regimes and subcultures discussed above could also be interpreted in terms of providing a 
better expected quality of match to one’s preferences.  With regard to learning, the larger 
flows of information in cities, and the greater quantity (as well as variety and perhaps 
quality) of group activities could allow faster learning about how to get the most utility 
out of leisure activities.  These potential consumption-oriented urban agglomeration 
effects range from the trivial to the profound, but they have received less attention from 
urban economists and economic geographers.  In this paper I will examine the effects of 
such agglomeration in consumption economies and compare their effects with other types 
of agglomeration.       
  Although recent attention has been focused primarily on increasing returns to 
urban scale, an older literature – and indeed much regional policy – was more concerned 
about the possibility that larger urban scale decreased utility or productivity.  Tolley 
(1974) and Tolley and Crihfield (1987) discuss this issue in great detail, while Blomquist 
                                                 
2 At least in theory, residents of Chicago have a higher chance of a local team winning the World Series 
than residents of Cincinnati or St. Louis.    
  7et al. (1988) allow for such effects.  While the focus of these papers on congestion effects 
is somewhat jarring given the recent spate of research on the benefits of urban 
concentration, it should be taken seriously.  First, it is not unreasonable to believe that 
residents of larger cities may face more negative externalities – such as air pollution, 
traffic congestion and crime – than smaller cities.  While Tolley (1974) is most concerned 
about these externalities when they are not internalized, even if they are internalized they 
will affect regional populations and prices.  Second, while these negative scale economies 
have received less attention, they represent the “received wisdom” from the planning and 
policy world of the pre-Krugman era.  While it seems odd that there would be cities at all 
without some form of local increasing returns, it is quite possible that those returns could 
be exhausted and that congestion economies dominate at the margin.  The model in this 
paper is flexible enough to easily allow for such congestion economies, so that I will be 
able to compare the effects of agglomeration to the effects of congestion on urban 
populations and prices.    
  Finally, one of the novel features of the model in this paper is that firms and 
consumers are heterogeneous with regards to a local attachment to their home area.  
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) started research along these lines in a model which combines 
heterogeneous consumers and a natural amenity in a NEG framework. Another 
important, but less novel feature is that increased population in an area increases land 
prices through a positively sloped supply of housing.  Tabuchi (1998) and Ottaviano, 
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) leave out heterogeneity or amenities, but include increasing 
land prices in their models.  Both sets of assumptions generate some moderation in the 
severe core-periphery results of the NEG model.  I am not aware of any papers that 
  8include amenities and heterogeneity along with increasing land prices in a NEG model.  
The importance of local housing supply conditions has been discussed recently in Glaeser 
et al. (2005, 2006), Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), Gyourko et al. (2006) and Gyourko and 
Saiz (2006).  This paper will combine all three factors (amenities, increasing local 
housing prices and heterogeneity), and add firm heterogeneity to the mix,
3 while 
remaining agnostic about the microfoundations (and indeed the direction) of any possible 
effects of urban scale on individuals’ objective functions.   
 
III. Model set-up. 
I assume that there is a continuum of firms and workers, each of measure one.  Residents 
have utility functions and firms have production functions which generate indirect utility 
functions (v) and profit functions (π) which depend on rents (r), wages (w) and a local 
characteristic, or amenity (A).  Firm profits and resident utility depend negatively on 
rents, while higher wages increase utility and decrease profits.  The effects of amenities 
on utility and profits could be anything, but to motivate the “natural advantage” 
interpretation of amenities, I will generally take the amenity’s effect on utility to be 
negligible and its effect on profits to be strong and positive.  In symbols: 
(, ; ) , 0 , 0 , 0
(, ; ) , 0 , 0 , 0
rwA
rwA
vrwA v v v




While rents and wages will be determined endogenously in the system, amenities will be 
set exogenously.  Firms and residents choose a bundle of rents, wages and amenities 
through location choice.  Each city is represented by a local combination of rents and 
                                                 
3 Firm heterogeneity is addressed in its own literature, and has been incorporated into a core-periphery 
model by Baldwin and Okubo (2006).  
  9wages (set endogenously), and amenities and housing supply shift factor (C, which will 
be introduced below) which are set exogenously.   
The first condition that must be satisfied for the system to be in equilibrium is that 
no firm or resident should wish to move.  Whether a firm or resident would wish to move 
from a city will depend on the amenities at that location, the rents, the wages and the 
costs of leaving the city, which will include physical moving costs that vary across 
individuals and the sacrifice of returns to local social and professional networks and local 
knowledge (as in Krupka 2007).  Firms and residents are thus modeled as having 
individual attachment or attraction to their home city.  The spatial equilibrium holds only 
if every agent’s economic profit from locating in the city exceeds zero.  Otherwise firms 
or residents will migrate and the rents and wages will need to adjust.  In symbols,  
1)  () ,; ( ) j rwA F ππ ϕ −≥ ⋅ ∼ . 
2)  () ,; ( ) i vrwA v G γ −≥ ⋅ ∼ . 
In equation (1), π is the reservation profit, or the profit the firm could make in some other 
city.  A similar interpretation of v pertains in equation (2) in terms of utility.  These 
reservation profits and utilities can be set to zero at no loss of generality.  The Greek 
letters φ and γ represent the gains to moving (or negative of the local attachment) and are 
distributed according to the CDFs F(.) and G(.), respectively.  Assuming the reservation 
utilities (v) and profits (π) are zero, the population of firms and residents willing to locate 
in a given city can be derived by plugging the profit and indirect utility functions into the 
distribution functions of the local attachments so that the measure of firms in a city is 
F(π(r, w; A)) and the measure of residents is G(v(r, w; A)).  One need not make any 
assumptions about F(.) or G(.) beyond those implied by the definition of a CDF.   
  10  For the metropolitan system to be in equilibrium, two additional conditions must 
hold.  These are that wages and rents adjust such that the supply and demand for labor 
and housing are equal.  In the labor market, we can assume for simplicity that each firm 
demands and each resident supplies one unit of labor.
4  Labor market equilibrium can 
thus be characterized as in equation (3): 
3)   .  () () (, ; ) (, ; ) 0 G v r w AFr w A π −=
Equation (3) implicitly defines wage as a function of amenities and rents.  I denote this 
function as w(r; A).  The effects of rents and amenities on wages (holding the other 

























The sign of these partial effects on wage is ambiguous in general.  However, for the case 
of amenities as “natural advantage” (with vA close to zero and πA much greater than zero) 
being used here, the effect of amenities on wages can be signed as positive, holding rents 
constant.   
  With the wage function w(r; A), it is also possible to derive the function of firm 
and residential population in a city, which will depend only on rents and amenities.  For 
firms, this function is: 
4)  .  () () () () ;, ; rA F rwrA A π Σ= ;
                                                 
4 This assumption can be relaxed without any qualitative change to the results.  The relaxation of this 
assumption is discussed at somewhat greater length in Krupka and Donaldson (2008).   
  11The effects of rents and amenities on firm population is Σr = F´(πr+πwwr) and ΣA = 
F´(πA+πwwA), respectively.
5  For residents the function is: 
5)  .  () () () () ;, ; rA GvrwrA A Ω= ;
                                                
The effects of rents and amenities on residential population is Ωr = G´(vr+vwwr) and ΩA = 
G´(vA+vwwA), respectively.  Because equation (3) must hold for any rent level and any 
amenity level, I will often be able to make use of the facts that Σ = Ω, that Ωr = Σr and 
that ΩA = ΣA.  Although it is not immediately obvious from the equations, it is worth 
pointing out that Ωr = Σr <0 because both firms and residents would prefer a location with 
lower rents to one with higher rents, all else equal.  An exogenous increase in rents will 
therefore drive both firm and residential population down, but have an ambiguous effect 
on wages.  Similarly, it can be shown that a “natural advantage” amenity will have a 
positive direct effect on population (ΩA= ΣA >0). 
  Before closing the model by invoking housing market equilibrium, a brief 
graphical exposition the theory to this point will be of use later when we start allowing 
for various agglomeration and congestion effects.  Figures 4a and 4b show the 
distribution of indifference curves in rent-wage space under two different assumptions.  
In 4a, individual heterogeneity is assumed away, as in the classic model of Roback 
(1982).  In this model where everyone is the same, rent and wages are uniquely 
determined by the level of amenities, and population is set by dividing the amount of 
available land in a city by the per capita demand for land.  In this set up, everyone is 
 
5 It bears emphasis that, although the value of F´ can vary with the value of profits at which the derivative 
is evaluated, in these partial effects the term enters only as a multiplier of the terms in parentheses.  The 
same statement applies to the interpretation of G´ below.   
  12indifferent between any two cities, because wages and rents adjust so that there are no 
gains to migration.  Costless migration guarantees this indifference.      
  In figure 4b, we see the situation is changed when migration costs vary across 
individuals.  Given the assumptions of the model (most importantly, that people and 
firms all prefer lower rents all else equal), the indifference curve (between a given city 
and the next best city) will depend on the heterogeneous local attachment.  To the left, 
with low rents, many firms and people will be willing to live in the city because 
inequalities (1) and (2) will hold for a large proportion of them.  As rents increase, fewer 
and fewer individual firms and residents will find the amenity-rent-wage combination 
satisfactory enough to prevent moving out of the city, and population decreases.  Figure 
4b highlights a few level curves out of the F(.) and G(.) distribution, but in actuality, the 
inequalities describe a surface in rent-wage-population space (this surface will change 
when amenities are changed).  In contrast to the Roback model represented in figure 4a, 
the setting of wages and rents is not straight forward.   
To generate the wage function, we impose labor market equilibrium where labor 
supply (the population of residents) equals labor demand (the population of firms).  This 
is essentially the intersection of the two surfaces described above.  Figure 5 shows the 
resulting wage function.  The slope of this wage function (wr) will become important 
below.  In a three dimensional graph, the population of firms and residents could be read 
off of the third axis, which is analytically accomplished by plugging the rent and amenity 
levels and wage function into the profit and indirect utility functions (π and v) and 
plugging the resulting functions of r and A into the CDFs of the local attachments for the 
population of firms and residents.    However, the imposition of equilibrium in the labor 
  13market does not tell us which of the possible rents, and thus wages and thus populations 
will be realized in the city in question for a given level of amenities (A). 
  Equation (3) allows local wages to adjust to clear the local labor market.  The 
other local price that adjusts is the local housing cost, or rent.  Local rents adjust so that 
the supply of housing equals the demand for housing: 
6)  .  (; ) (; ) (, (; ) ) 0 SrC rADrwrA −Ω =
New in equation (6) are a housing supply function (S) and a per capita housing demand 
function (D).  Housing supply is assumed to be increasing in rents and decreasing in the 
housing supply constraint or cost shifter, C (Sr > 0, SC < 0).
6  The housing supply shift 
factor will later allow me to generate exogenous changes in city population to assess the 
effects of such increases on rents and wages.  Housing demand represents the combined 
demand for space that each worker/resident generates through their demand for space at 
home and at work.  In essence, it is the demand for space for each resident and the firm 
which employs him.
7 This per capita demand for housing is assumed to increase with 
wages (Dw>0), decrease with rents holding wages constant (Dr<0), and decrease with 
rents when wages adjust (Dr+Dwwr<0).   
  Equation (6) implicitly defines rents as a function of amenities and housing 
supply shifters.  Since wages and populations are functions only of rents and amenities, 
equation (6) closes the model.  The general equilibrium effect of changes in housing 











                                                 
6 The housing supply shift factor is discussed more thoroughly in Krupka and Donaldson (2008).  Here, it 
suffices to say that these shifts could arise due to local geographical, geological or regulatory conditions. 
7 Modeling the housing/space demands of firms and residents separately is possible, but not enlightening. 






dd r d r




















7f)  Ar A r
dd r d r
dA dA dA dA
ΩΣ
=Ω +Ω =Σ +Σ =
d
 
With these results in hand, it is straightforward to see how well this purely neo-
classical framework does at generating the three relationships among city wages, rents 
and population that we observe in the data.  Population can be changed exogenously by 
changing C to allow for more or less people to live in the city.  Tightening the supply 
constraint will increase rents (the denominator in 7a and 7d is positive), have an 
ambiguous effect on wages (wr is ambiguous in 7b) and decrease population (Ωr and Σr 
are negative in 7c).  Thus, the pure neoclassical model predicts no correlation between 
wages and the other two local characteristics, and a negative correlation between 
population and rents.  These predictions are not consistent with observed patterns. 
In the neo-classical setting, natural advantage does a somewhat better job 
generating the observed correlations.  An amenity that increases profits but does not 
affect utility will increase rents unambiguously (wA and ΩA will both be positive in 7d).  
There is some ambiguity in the general equilibrium effect on wages (7e) because the 
clearly positive direct effect of amenities on wages (wA) is combined with an ambiguous 




).  If the partial effect of rents on wages is 
  15either positive or small in magnitude, the total effect of natural advantage on wages will 
be positive.  If this is the case, the neo-classical model with natural advantage will predict 
a positive correlation between rents and wages, although that correlation might be weak.  
Finally, the general equilibrium effect of natural advantage on population (7f) is at first 
examination ambiguous.  The positive direct effect of the natural advantage amenity on 




Ω ).  Because 
dr
dA
is actually a function of both ΩA and  r Ω , it is difficult to 
break this ambiguity by choosing particular values of more fundamental quantities 
because those things that tend to make the positive components of (7f) larger in 
magnitude will also tend to make the negative components large in magnitude as well.  
Thus, while natural advantage somewhat predicts one of the three positive correlations 
(between wages and rents) it does not predict the other two correlations (between wages 
or rents and population) that we observe in the actual data.
8  The apparent ambiguity of 
the natural advantage effect on populations will be something we return to later after 
exploring different assumptions about the effects of urban scale on profits and utility. 
 
IV. Urban scale effects. 
The simple neoclassical construction of a general equilibrium model in section III did not 
generate the pattern of rents, wages and populations we observe.  While naturally 
                                                 
8 If the partial effect of rents on wages were negative, this would suggest a positive correlation between 
wages and population because both general equilibrium effects (of natural advantage) would share the 
dr/dA term multiplied by a negative number.  However, this would weaken or negate the positive 
correlation between wages and rents.  Similarly, if the effect of natural advantage on rents were very small, 
the correlation between wages and population would be stronger, but the correlation between rents and 
these quantities would be smaller.   So, to the extent that the pure natural advantage effect can generate the 
second correlation, it looses its ability to generate the first correlation.   
  16advantaged areas will have higher rents and wages, the model does not appear to suggest 
that these exogenous increases in productivity will increase populations.  This leads to a 
natural question of whether the causation might run in the other direction.  Might higher 
population cause higher productivity?  In this section, I embed a kind of “black box” 
agglomeration technology into the model from section III to assess whether an 
agglomeration effect in production will generate the three-fold correlation between rents, 
wages and population.  This section also generates results for agglomeration 
diseconomies, or congestion effects, and for agglomeration economies in consumption.  
The results from the different models will be compared in the next section. 
A.  Agglomeration economies in production. 
While the literature on agglomeration economies has been very rigorous and drawn many 
useful distinctions between various sources of agglomeration, the most influential 
theories have all posited some form of production-oriented agglomeration.  In this paper, 
I remain agnostic about the foundations of any agglomeration effects.  Instead, I assume 
that, in the end, these agglomeration effects will make firms more productive, and thus 
increase profits for any given level of rents, wages and non-agglomeration amenities.    
  In symbols, the profit function for firms in the presence of agglomeration 
economies in production (AP) is: 
(, , ; ) , () , 0 , 0 . AP AP AP AP u rwu A u u u π π ′ =Σ > >  
In words, the profits of a firm will now depend positively on the new urbanization 
variable (uAP), which is increasing in the population of firms (Σ) in the city.  The indirect 
utility function of the residents is not affected by these agglomeration effects.   
  17  With this minor modification to the profit function made, we can then proceed 
with the solution of the model as in section III, with one more consideration.  Referring 
back to the partial effects of rents and amenities on wages, the size and signs of these 
effects depended on two factors: the relative effect of rents or amenities on profits and 
utility (the π and v terms), and the population-response of firms and residents to changes 
in profits and utility (F´ and G´).  Because profits are now a function of population of 
firms, this result needs to be modified. 
  Of interest is the effect of a change in some factor (r or A) on the population of 
firms, given the effect of population of firms on the urbanization economy (uAP) and its 
effect back on profits.  The effect of such a factor on population will thus be made of a 
direct effect (through the profit function) and an indirect effect through population itself 
in the following manner: 
8)  xu A P FF u
x x
ππ
∂Σ ∂Σ ′′ ′ =+
∂∂
, 
where x could be either rent or amenities.  The first term in equation (8) is the direct 
effect on population through profits: the effect of x on profits times the effect of profits 
on the population of firms.  The second term is the indirect or “second round” effect that 
x has on population, times population’s effect on agglomeration economies, times 
agglomeration’s effect on profits times profit’s effect on the population of firms.  
Rearranging terms, we get the effect of some factor x on population in the presence of 













  18Again, in this model x can stand in for either rents or amenities.  While this derivation is 
somewhat informal, the same result is available via a more involved application of the 
implicit function rule in a multi-equation setting.  This result implies one major change in 
the output of the model vis-à-vis the neoclassical model from section III.  Whereas the 
neoclassical model often included the term F´ in results (such as wr, wA, Σr and ΣA), in the 
model with agglomeration this term must be replaced with  ( ) 1 uA P FF u π ′ ′′ − .  Once this 
change has been made, the rest of the model can be solved in the same way as in the neo-
classical case by imposing labor market equilibrium to derive wage and population 
functions, then imposing housing market equilibrium to identify local rents, wages and 
populations conditional on housing supply constraints and amenities.   
  Before moving onto those results, a brief graphical presentation of the model with 
agglomeration economies may be useful.  Figure 6 reproduces figure 5 with the old level 
curves and wage function reproduced for comparison with dashed lines.  Because higher 
population of firms increases profits, the level curves for firms will change in the 
presence of agglomeration effects.   Moving from right to left along the old wage curve 
(w(r; A)), the lower rents were associated in the neoclassical model with higher 
populations.  But, because higher populations are essentially an additional productive 
amenity for firms, more firms will be willing to locate in the city as rents decrease.  The 
level curve representing the same proportion of firms will now move slightly to the right; 
the same proportion of firms will be willing to pay higher rents or wages in order to gain 
access to the city’s amenities and population/agglomeration economies.  As rents get 
lower and population gets larger, this additional agglomeration effect will become more 
powerful, so the shift in each level curve becomes greater.  In terms of the three-
  19dimensional surface that these level curves describe, agglomeration makes it slope more 
steeply with respect to rents.  Labor market equilibrium thus changes, and the new wage 
function (w(r, uAP; A)) will tend to be more negatively sloped than the old one.  
Technically, it is possible for the agglomeration economies to be so strong that all the 
level curves stack up on one another and the slope of the population function with respect 
to rent becomes undefined (analytically, this happens when 1 uA P Fu π ′ ′ = ) or even 
becomes positively slope uA P Fu d (when 1 π ′ ′ < ).  However, I assume that – while 
agglomeration economies exist – they are not strong enough to make firms appear to 
“like” higher rents.   
  The addition of agglomeration economies changes the intermediate functions
the model’s solu
 of 
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In comparison to the neo-classical model, the model with agglomeration generates a 
wage function that is more likely negatively-sloped with respect to rents
AP
rr w < ), but 
more positively-sloped with respect to productive amenities ( 0
AP
AA ww >> ).  The 






























  20The effects of the agglomeration economy on residential population are more subtle: 
AP AP
rr w r Gv v w ′ Ω= +
 
Despite th tions, labo
A .  The first of these pairs can be shown to be negative and 
 the model with 
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the second to be positive.   
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Examining these results, a tightening of the housing supply constraint will increase ren
(10a), have an ambiguous but probably negative effect on wages (10b) and a negative 
effect on population (10c).  The housing supply constraint, C, is the primary lever in th
model to induce exogenous changes in population.  What these results suggest is that 
dd r d r d ΩΣ
=Ω +Ω =Σ +Σ =
ts 
is 
  21agglomeration effects alone will not generate the three positive correlations betwe
rents, wages and city population.  Agglomeration will likely generate a negative 
correlation between rents and wages and betw
en 




relation between population and wages.   
correlation between wages and population.   
 Agglomeration  forces  in combination with natural advantage will have different
effects.  In this setting with agglomeration, natural advantage will increase rents (10d), 
have an ambiguous effect on wages (10e), and an ambiguous effect on population (1
Thus, natural advantage combined with agglomeration in production eliminates the 
negative correlations between rents and wages and between rents and po
retains a probable positive cor
B. Congestion in production.
We now can turn our attention to the predictions of the model in the presence of 
agglomeration diseconomies, or congestion effects.  The model is easily modifi
allow for this possibility.  The new profit function for firms facing congestion 
externalities (Co) looks the
ed to 
 same as in the case of agglomeration, but the urban scale 
effects are now negative: 
(, , ; ) , () , 0 , 0 . Co Co Co Co u rwu A u u u π π ′ =Σ < >  
This change is shown graphically in figure 7.  Figure 7 presents in dashed lines
function from the neoclassical model of figure 5.  However, in contrast to the 
agglomeration model, the increases in population that occur as one moves leftward alon
the wage curve are now a disamenity to firms (it decreases their productivity), driving 
their willingness to locate in the city down.  In terms of the surface that these level curves 
 the wage 
g 
represent, it is becoming less negatively sloped with respect to rent.  These changes imply 
  22that after the imposition of labor market equilibrium, the wage function is more likely to 
be positively sloped than in the neo-classical or agglomeration cases.   
Propagating this change through the intermediate results in the model we arrive at 
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The change is visually subtle: the AP index has been changed to Co.  However, the 
changes in functional form are important.  As mentioned earlier,  . So 
is likely positive.  Also, for natural advantage type productive amenities, 
.  
AP Co





AA A ww w >> >
The partial effects of rents or amenities on firm population are also visually 












































It is still the case that   and that  0
Co Co
rr Ω= Σ< 0
Co Co
AA Ω =Σ > .  In comparison to the 
agglomeration model, the partial effect of rent on population will be larger (less negative) 
and the partial effect of productive amenities on population will be smaller.     
  23  Plugging these new partial effects into the general equilibrium effects of changes 
in rents and amenities yields the following results, which are identical to those in 
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With congestion, an exogenous decrease in housing supply will increase rents (11a), 
increase wages (11b, assuming that  ) and decrease population (11c).  These 
results suggest a positive correlation between wages and rents, but a negative relationship 
between these local prices and population.  In the presence of congestion, cities with 
more “natural advantage” will have higher rents (11d) and higher wages (11e), but the 




C. Agglomeration economies in consumption.
The final modification we make to the model is to allow the agglomeration or 
urbanization effects of city scale to affect consumers instead of producers.  In terms of 
  24the model presented here, we can allow for such effects by making the urbanization 
economy affect residents’ utility (as opposed to affecting firms’ profits as in part IV.A).  
Therefore, in the agglomeration in consumption (AC) model, the profit function of the 
firms will be the same as in section III, but the indirect utility function will be modified 
as follows: 
(, , ; ) ( ) , 0 , 0 AC AC AC AC u vrwu A u u u v ′ =Ω > > . 
This change is represented graphically in figure 8, where the agglomeration in 
consumption effect makes consumers willing to pay higher rents as population goes up 
because the higher population increases their utility.  This makes the wage curve more 
positively sloped, and makes the population function steeper with respect to rents.   
  Analytically, this change in the model means that the effect of changes in profits 
on firm population goes back to F′ (as in section III), and that the effect of utility on 
residential population must be changed to reflect the consumption agglomeration effects.  
In this context, the term () 1 uA C GG v u ′′ ′ − must be substituted forG′, relative to section 
III.
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As in the congestion case, the rental wage effect is larger than the neoclassical rental 
wage effect, but the amenity effect is smaller.  The partial effects of rents and amenities 
on firm population then become: 
 
9 As in the AP model, I assume that 1 - G´vuuÁC > 0, or that agglomeration is not strong enough to make residents 










































The partial effect of rents on firm or residential population will be larger (less negative) 
than the same effect in the neo-classical or agglomeration in production cases, but the 
partial effect of amenity on population will be smaller (less positive).   
  Taking these changes, the general equilibrium effects of supply constraints and 
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  26The results are qualitatively identical to those for the case of congestion.  A decrease in 
the housing supply leads to higher rents (12a) and wages (12b), but lower populations 
(12c), retaining the negative correlation between population and the two local prices.  
Natural advantage combined with agglomeration in consumption leads to higher rents 
(12d) and wages (12e), but the effect on population is again indeterminate (12f).   
 
V. Comparing models. 
In this section I collect the results from the various models of urban scale effects and 
compare them.  In doing so, the relative sizes of the partial effects of rent and a natural 
advantage amenity on wages and populations bear repeating. 
13a)   
AP Co AC
rr r ww ww << ≈ r
13b)    0
AP Co AC
AA AA ww ww >> ≈ >
Co AC
rr ww =  and   whenever 
Co AC
AA ww = ( ) 11 1 uA C uC o Gvu F u π ′ ′′ −= − ′ .  This represents a 
situation where the congestion effect and the consumer agglomeration effects are of equal 
“intensity.”  If that is the case, then the relative size of the partial effects of rents and 
amenities on residential population is also derivable. 
14a)    0
AP AC Co
rr rr Ω< Ω < Ω< Ω<
14b)    0
AP AC Co
AA AA Ω> Ω > Ω> Ω>
The relationships between the population effects under the consumption agglomeration 
assumptions and the congestion assumptions only hold with certainty under the additional 
assumption mentioned above that  ( ) 11 1 uA C uC o Gvu F u π ′ ′′ −= − ′ .  This is an attractive 
baseline for comparison since it holds the strength of the congestion or consumer 
  27agglomeration forces to be equal, in a sense, and the differences can thus be attributed to 
the type of urban scale effect rather than the strength.  The comparison between the 
production agglomeration effect and the other effects holds whatever the strength of the 
agglomeration. 
  Looking at the general equilibrium effects of housing supply constraints on the 
endogenous variables is instructive because this represents the effect of an exogenous 
decrease in population.  These effects consist of the rental effect, and the rental effects’ 
indirect effect on wages and population.  For all four urban scale effects, the restriction of 
housing supply increases rents.  The general equilibrium effect on rents can be ordered as 
follows: 
0
AP AC Co dr dr dr dr
dC dC dC dC
<< << . 
Inequality (13a) allows us to order the general equilibrium effect on wages across urban 
scale assumptions.  Because   is probably negative and because   are 





AP AC Co dw dw dw dw
dC dC dC dC
<< < , 
with zero falling somewhere between the agglomeration in production (AP) and 
agglomeration in consumption (AC) effects.  Finally, the population effects are all 
negative.  Ordering the magnitude of the effects is difficult because the magnitude of the 
two components of the general equilibrium effect ( r Ω  and 
dr
dC
) move in opposite 
directions as one changes the assumptions about the effects of urban scale on productivity 
and utility.  However, all four effects are clearly negative. 
  28  Table I combines these results into tabular form.  The top panel reports the signs 
of the general equilibrium effects under the various urban scale assumptions for the three 
endogenous variables.  The bottom panel reports the theoretically implied correlations.  
We see that the consistently negative population effects and consistently positive rental 
effects generate a consistent negative implied covariance between city rents and 
population.  On the other hand, the general equilibrium effects on wages change with the 
model: they are negative in the agglomeration in production models, positive in the 
agglomeration for consumers and congestion models, and ambiguous of sign for the 
neoclassical model.  This changes the implied correlations in the second panel.  On their 
own, none of these urban-scale-effects assumptions do a very good job of generating the 
strong positive relationships between these variables that we observe in the real world.   
  If urbanization/congestion economies do not generate the pattern of local prices 
and population that we observe in the data, the question becomes whether natural 
advantage can explain these patterns, either alone or in combination with the urban scale 
effects.  It can be shown that larger wA, wr, ΩA and Ωr all make the general equilibrium 
effect of natural advantage on rents larger.    Because of this fact, and combined with 
inequalities (13) and (14), it is not possible to know which type of urban scale effect will 
have the largest rental effect of natural advantage.  However, as has been highlighted in 
the previous sections, this quantity is unambiguously positive.   
Holding the rental effect roughly constant, it is almost certain that the general 
equilibrium effect of natural advantage on wages is positive for the congestion and 
agglomeration in consumption models.  It is likely that the effect is positive in the 
neoclassical model, while the sign of this effect in the agglomeration in production model 
  29is ambiguous because the direct effect of natural advantage on wages is combined with a 
(probably) negative partial effect of rents on wages.  Thus, a likely ordering of the general 
equilibrium wage effects is 
AP AC Co dw dw dw dw
dA dA dA dA
<< ≈ , 
with the first two terms being of ambiguous sign.   
The ordering of the general equilibrium effects of natural advantage on population 
is also difficult because the partial effects involved (ΩA and Ωr) always have the same 
sign across models, and because they move in opposite directions when the 
agglomeration/congestion assumptions are changed.  Although this effect is ambiguous in 
the most general case, it can be signed for more specific functional forms.  Appendix 1 
shows that this effect will be positive regardless of the type of urban scale effect 
assumed, at least if residents have CES utility over housing and all other goods.
10  For the 
two-good case, this is a fairly general functional form, and can be taken as an example.  
This proposition is proved under more general assumptions about the utility function in 
appendix 2.       
  Table II reports the signs of the theoretical general equilibrium effects of natural 
advantage and the implied empirical correlations as in table I.
11  Comparing tables I and 
II, one thing is clear immediately.  Whatever the assumptions one makes about the effects 
of urban scale on people’s or firms’ objective functions, the model’s output is made much 
more similar to objective reality with the addition of natural advantage.  With natural 
advantage included in the model, six negative correlations become positive, one becomes 
                                                 
10 I have also checked the results for a general quasi-linear utility function and reached the same result as 
long as marginal utility is declining in all other goods. 
11 For this table, I maintain the assumptions laid out in appendix 2. 
  30ambiguous and two ambiguous effects become less ambiguous.
12  In comparing a model 
with or without natural advantage, it is clear that a natural advantage model makes the 
better predictions about how these three city characteristics co-vary.   
  Comparing across models within table II (assuming natural advantage), a 
surprising result arises.  Agglomeration economies which affect productivity (AP) do the 
worst in terms of generating the expected patterns.  While the effect of natural advantage 
in combination with agglomeration on rents and population is strong here, the effect on 
wages is weaker.  While we might be willing to assume this effect is positive, it suggests 
that the correlation between wages and rents might be weak.  On the other hand, the 
congestion effects model (Co) and the model with agglomeration economies in 
consumption (AC) predict unambiguous positive correlations between all three variables, 
with the neo-classical model providing a bit of a mix of the two sets of assumptions.  
  If we imagine a world where potential city-sites have varying levels of both 
natural advantage (A) and housing supply constraints (C), the results reported in tables I 
and II reinforce the intuition that the Co and AC models outperform the AP model.  Even 
granting a positive general equilibrium effect of natural advantage on wages in the AP 
model, the independent variation in C, or housing supply, across potential city sites will 
tend to decrease the correlation between rents and wages in the AP model, while it would 
tend to increase the correlation between wages and population.  For the Co and AC 
models, this independent variation in C across city sites would tend to increase the 
correlation between rents and wages while it tended to decrease the correlation between 
population and rents (and between population and wages).  Thus, if the actual landscape 
                                                 
12 The implied correlation between rents and wages in the neoclassical model actually goes from 
completely ambiguous to probably positive with natural advantage.  Although this correlation is somewhat 
ambiguous, it is definitely more likely to be positive with natural advantage than without.   
  31varies in terms of natural advantage and housing supply constraints, the AP model 
predicts a stronger correlation between wages and population than between wages and 
rents, while the Co and AC models predict a stronger relationship between wages and 
rents than between wages and population.  Looking at figures 1 through 3 and the implied 
correlations (about .82 between wages and rents and about .45 between population and 
either wages and rents), it is clear that the congestion or agglomeration in consumption 
models match the data better, at least for America in the early 21
st century.   
 
VI. Conclusion. 
This paper has attempted to generate a prevalent feature of economic geography – the 
positive correlation amongst wages, rents and population – from a simple general 
equilibrium model with varying assumptions about how urban scale affects firms’ profits 
and residents’ utility.  While the model is dissimilar to many recent models in the 
agglomeration literature, it has several virtues.  First, the assumptions are quite general.  
The assumptions needed for the results are that firms like low costs, that residents like 
high real incomes, that firms and residents vary in their attachment to specific places, and 
that cities vary with respect to the supply of housing and the natural advantage amenities 
available to them.  This model generates rents, wages and populations for any 
combination of housing supply constraints and natural advantage.  The model is easily 
modified to make radically different assumptions about the effects of urban scale on 
firms’ and residents’ well-being.   
  Within this framework – and with the additional assumptions that the laws of 
demand and supply hold, that preferences are well-behaved and that housing is a normal 
  32good – I am able to derive how natural advantage and housing supply constraints will 
affect rents, wages and populations, and assess whether the derived patterns conform with 
observed empirical patterns across a variety of different effects of urban scale.  The 
results show that no assumptions about urban scale generate the pattern of local prices 
and population without the additional influence of natural advantage.  In combination 
with natural advantage, all four sets of assumptions about urban scale effects do a 
reasonable job of producing the pattern, although one must give agglomeration in 
production the benefit of the doubt.  Even granting this, however, the combination of 
variation in natural advantage and in supply constraints suggests different patterns in the 
relative strength of the relationships, depending on the assumptions one makes about how 
urban scale affects individual welfare.  Production agglomeration economies imply a 
stronger relationship between wages and population while consumption agglomeration or 
congestion economies imply a stronger relationship between rents and wages.  The 
predictions of the congestion or consumer agglomeration models, then, are more 
consistent with the data than the agglomeration model. 
  The significance of these results is thus twofold.  First, the requirement of natural 
advantage to generate any of the patterns is significant since much of the agglomeration 
literature has sought to generate cities in a featureless landscape.  This is not to say that 
assuming a featureless landscape implies the belief in such a landscape in reality.  The 
generation of agglomerations on a featureless landscape is important in terms of 
understanding what goes on in cities and why they form.  The featureless plain is the only 
place to start such a theoretical exploration.  These results suggest that while the 
featureless plain is an important starting place for these explorations, it is not an 
  33appropriate ending place in our understanding of cities and why they form.  If economics 
is the science of how people make the best of their situation, then it would be surprising if 
they did not take advantage of the natural variation in the landscape which certainly 
exists.  These results suggest that in the presence of increasing local housing prices (a 
positively sloped housing supply curve) and heterogeneity in local attachments, 
agglomeration alone will not induce the positive correlation between housing and labor 
prices and population.  Some natural variation in the landscape is necessary for this 
pattern to arise.    
  Assuming some variation in the natural advantage amenity, these results also 
suggest that at the margins (where we observe real cities), production agglomeration 
makes for a poorer match with observed data than consumer agglomeration or 
congestion.  This informs the debate on the microfoundations of agglomeration 
economies.  Most of the energy of recent theoretical explorations of agglomeration 
economies has focused mainly on productivity-related explanations.  Duranton and Puga 
(2004) categorize these microfoundations into sharing, matching and learning effects.
13  
Their discussion of these effects makes it clear that – with the possible exception of risk 
sharing of job seekers – most of these effects are benefiting producers by making them 
more profitable or more productive.  These results suggest that the microfoundations of 
urbanization economies in consumption deserve more attention in the future, and that the 
possibility of substantial marginal congestion economies – which have received very 
little attention in recent years – also deserves a second look from economists.   
                                                 
13 NEG models combine a mix of production effects (the market access effect) and consumer effects (lower 
cost of living in the agglomeration).  A combination of producer and consumer agglomeration forces in the 
present model would look more or less like the neo-classical model in its output, but with more negative 
Ωr. 
  34  Of course, to the extent that the models’ output is compared to patterns in the 
prices and populations of already developed cities that are at or near equilibrium, these 
conclusions may not be consistent with the fundamental forces that cities embody.  It is 
entirely possible that cities form due to production-oriented agglomeration but that these 
increasing returns may have been exhausted.  What these results and the comparison to 
the data suggest is that at the margin, those production agglomeration economies have 
been exhausted, and that marginal changes in population and prices are best explained by 
either congestion economies or by agglomeration economies geared towards consumers.  
As discussed above, there are many ways to justify such urban scale effects.  Indeed, the 
broad categories of microfoundations discussed in Duranton and Puga (2004) can be 
interpreted (at least loosely) in terms of affects on consumers’ utility instead of firms’ 
profits.   Within the NEG model, consumer-oriented agglomeration is already embodied 
in the form of lower local prices.  However, these consumer-oriented agglomeration 
economies are more latent in these models than explicit.  Hopefully, they will receive 
more formal theoretical and empirical examination in the future.   
 
Appendix 1: Proof that natural advantage increases population for CES utility. 












In equation (A1), the “X” superscript indexes the different models in the paper: 
agglomeration in production (AP), neoclassical (no superscript), agglomeration in 
  35consumption (AC) and congestion (Co).  Substituting in for the general equilibrium effect 
of natural advantage on rents and re-arranging terms yields: 
() () ( )
XX X XX X X
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Because within every model, X, the two terms in the quotient on the r.h.s. of inequality 
(A2) will share a leading coefficient, and because vA = 0 for natural advantage type 
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The last terms on each side of the inequality cancel out, and the common   term can be 
multiplied out.  Finally, by Roy’s identity, the remaining term on the r.h.s. can be 
replaced by the Marshallian demand for housing: -v
X
A w
r/vw = D.  After some additional 











Because the l.h.s. of inequality (A3) is positive, (A3) and thus (A1) will be satisfied 
whenever the r.h.s. of inequality (A3) is negative.  It is certainly possible for (A3) to 
hold, since the r.h.s. includes a positive and a negative term.  It is easily shown that (A3) 
holds under Cobb-douglas utility, where D = αw/r.   
  36  This result also holds for the more general CES utility function (over housing and 
all other goods).  Under those additional assumptions, demand is: 
()





− − ⎛⎞ =+ ⎜⎟
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k . 
Here, the second price term in the CES demand function has been replaced with a 
constant, k, since the “other good” is a numeraire and its price will thus not change.  The 
standard substitution of  σ = 1/(1-ρ) has also been made, so that  σ > 0.  The partial 
derivatives needed to assess whether (A3) holds are as follows: 
() () ()
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The last two parenthetical terms in the brackets can be substituted either with Dw or with 
D/w.  The second substitution is more convenient.  Substituting the resulting functions 
into inequality (A3) yields: 









σ σσ ⎡⎤ >− +− = − ⎢⎥ Ω ⎣⎦
. 
As the l.h.s. is positive, this inequality will hold if the r.h.s. is negative.  Because we 
know that σ > 0, (A4) will hold whenever rD w ≤ .  However, because w is income and 
  37rD is total expenditure on housing, this inequality must hold to satisfy the budget 
constraint.  
 
Appendix 2: Proof for more general utility functions. 
Inequality (A3) can be shown to hold for the more general case of all continuous utility 
functions representing locally non-satiated, strictly convex preferences.  These 
assumptions are quite general.  Noting again that the l.h.s. of inequality (A3) is positive 
under the assumptions in the paper’s model, one must only show that the r.h.s. is negative 









+≤ ⇒ > . 
Multiplying both sides of inequality (A5) by Dw > 0 yields: 
A6)  .  0 wr DD D +≤
Under the assumptions laid out above, the Slutsky Equation tells us that the l.h.s. of 
inequality (A6) is equal to the compensated, or Hicksian own-price effect, which we 
know to be negative.   
  Thus, under the very general assumptions of continuous, locally non-satiated, 
strictly convex preferences, one need only assume that housing is a normal good (Dw > 0) 
to ensure that natural advantage amenities increase population in equilibrium.  This is an 
assumption which has been maintained in the rest of the paper, and which is extremely 
defensible.   
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Metro-Avg. Rent (logged) 
Note: Each data point represents one city.  The regression line running through the data 
has an intercept of 6.227 and slope of .616 (.025 standard error) with an r-squared of .669. 





























Log Metro Population 
Note: Each data point represents one city.  The regression line running through the data 
has an intercept of 8.977 and slope of .085 (.010 standard error) with an r-squared of .197. 


























Log Metro Population 
Note: Each data point represents one city.  The regression line running through the data 
has an intercept of 4.677 and slope of .122 (.013 standard error) with an r-squared of .227. 
 
Figure 4: Rent-Wage Space 
 
  4a: No heterogeneity        4b: With hetergeneity 
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  42Figure 5: Labor market equilibrium and the wage function 
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  43Figure 7: labor market equilibrium and wage curve with congestion in 
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  44Table I: Effects and implied correlations from supply shifts (C). 
 
      Urban Scale Assumptions: 
 Sign of General Equilibrium Effect:  AP Neoclassical AC  Co 
Rents Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Wages Negative Ambiguous  Positive  Positive   
Population Negative Negative Negative Negative 
 Implied Correlations:           
Rents/Wages Negative Ambiguous  Positive  Positive 
Wages/Population Positive Ambiguous  Negative  Negative   
Rent/Population Negative Negative Negative Negative 
 
 
Table II:  Effects and implied correlations from Natural Advantage (A). 
 
   Urban Scale Assumptions: 
Sign of General Equilibrium Effect:  AP Neoclassical AC  Co 
Rents Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Wages Ambiguous Amb/Pos  Positive  Positive   
Population Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Implied Correlations:         
Rents/Wages Ambiguous Amb/Pos  Positive  Positive 
Wages/Population Ambiguous Amb/Pos  Positive  Positive   
Rent/Population Positive Positive Positive Positive 
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